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Abstract
We present a dynamic model of venture capital nancing, described as a sequential in-
vestment problem with uncertain outcome. Each venture has a critical, but unknown threshold
beyond which it cannot progress. If the threshold is reached before the completion of the project,
then the project fails, otherwise it succeeds. The investors decide sequentially about the speed of
the investment and the optimal path of staged investments. We derive the dynamically optimal
funding policy in response to the arrival of information during the development of the venture.
We develop three types of predictions from our theoretical model and test these predictions in
a large sample of venture capital investments in the U.S. for the period of 1987-2002.
First, the investment ow starts low if the failure risk is high and accelerates as the projects
mature. Second, the investment ow reacts positively to information that arrives while the
project is developed. We nd that the investment decisions are more sensitive to the information
received during the development than to the information held prior to the project launch. Third,
investors distribute their investments over more funding rounds if the failure risk is larger.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
An innovative project typically has to go through many stages of exploration and development
that all require capital outlays before it is completed. Moreover, it carries a substantial failure risk
and it is di¢ cult to predict at which point in time evidence might emerge that would lead to its
abandonment. While the optimal investment policy depends on the current information available,
the progress of research uncovers new information about the project and reduces uncertainty that
in turn will inuence the optimal continuation strategy. The venture capital industry is a powerful
example of the importance of these feedback e¤ects in the nancing of innovation. But similar
issues also arise for innovative projects within large organizations or in publicly funded research.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the relationship between project-related information
and the sequentially optimal investment decisions. We develop a theory that analyzes how investors
- venture capitalists or other sponsors that provide the nancing and help shepherding a project to
success - make optimal dynamic investment decisions as a function of their information about failure
risk and potential nal value. In our theoretical model, we distinguish between information that
investors have before the funding decision and information they receive as the project advances.
We analyze the relative impact of ex ante information and interim information, respectively, on
subsequent investment decisions.
We then put the predictions of our model to an empirical test. We use a comprehensive sample
of the US venture capital data to examine whether we nd support for our predicted relationships.
Our empirical ndings lend support to the main predictions of our model: First, investors proceed
cautiously if the failure risk is high, and they accelerate investment, in spite of the cost of doing so,
as projects mature. They also invest faster if they hold favorable information about the project.
Second, the investment ow reacts positively to information that arrives during the development
of the project, and interim learning seems to be more important for the determination of the
investment path and a better predictor of the nal outcome than ex ante information. Third, if
the failure risk is large then investors tend to adopt a more hands-on approach by adjusting their
investment strategy more frequently.
We consider a continuous-time model representing the complete investment cycle of an innov-
ative project under uncertainty, characterized by: (i) uncertainty about the likelihood of success;
(ii) uncertainty about the arrival of the failure event; and (iii) interim information about the
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failure risk and the nal value of the project. Our model depicts the progress of the project as
a continuous process of development and research. At each point in time, information that the
project should be abandoned may arrive. Thus, the model incorporates a simple stopping problem.
The signal that the project should be abandoned arises with a given probability, derived from the
Pareto distribution with parameter . The family of Pareto distributions has the property that the
conditional probability of failure is decreasing over time.
In our stylized model, we focus on two essential dimensions of the sequential investment de-
cisions. The rst dimension is that investors determine the speed with which the project is un-
dertaken, or the optimal capital ow. The decision about the optimal speed of investment is
characterized by the following trade-o¤: a larger investment ow into the project promises faster
success, but is likely to reduce the e¢ ciency of the investment. The investors control the optimal
investment ow at every point in time and decide (i) on the speed with which they want to develop
a project, (ii) on the change in the investment pace as the project progresses, and (iii) on the
adjustment in the nancing speed if new information arises that changes the expectation of key
parameters, notably failure risk and nal value in the event of success.
The second dimension that we take into account is the optimal degree of investor involvement.
Venture capitalists typically provide nancing in infrequent nancing rounds or stages, lasting from
a few months to over a year or more. They also dene milestones that must be met before a certain
fraction of the funds is released. Each nancing round necessitates a thorough review and valuation
exercise, it typically involves several parties (venture nancing is often syndicated among several
funds and the managers are involved as well) and a multilateral negotiation process. With these
resource constraints and transaction costs in mind, it is then optimal to review the project only at
certain intervals, even if this implies a temporarily suboptimal investment path.
We add these considerations to our continuous-time model. Our goal is to specically under-
stand the intertemporal pattern of stage nancing and its interaction with the available information.
Critically, the determination of the nancing rounds, their expected duration and the associated
investment ow and the intermediate milestones are endogenous in our model. In this analysis,
investors make lumpy investment decisions that are optimized as a function of the expected value
and the probability of failure. We model the cost of each investment decision as a loss that is
proportional to the current value of the project. With this analysis, we add the following questions
to our investigation: (iv) How do transaction costs and the need for lumpy investment decisions
a¤ect the optimal investment path? (v) What is the optimal sequence of stage nancing?
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The contributions of our theoretical analysis fall into three groups. First, we show that as
a project advances and the probability of eventual success increases, investment ows should be
optimally increasing. For the same reason, a project with a higher estimated nal value or a
higher anticipated chance to succeed is also allocated a larger investment ow throughout. With
an increase in the probability to succeed, accelerating becomes a more valuable option, even if it
makes the investment more costly. In fact, our model shows that the investment ow should be
increasing over time as a pure informational e¤ect as the risk of failure recedes. Our model predicts
that the observable returns are decreasing even though the increasing investment ows imply an
acceleration in the discovery process. Second, we show that the optimal staging sequence depends
on the value of the real option to abandon. The higher the estimated nal value of the project
is, and the larger the estimated success probability, the fewer rounds will be used. Also, echoing
our result on the optimal investment path for continuous decisions, the investment ow increases
from one round to the next. Third, we show that learning about the expected nal value or the
failure probability is incorporated in all subsequent investment decisions. If there is a positive news
update then the value of the project increases as well as the investment ow. At the same time,
the number of subsequent investment rounds decreases, and the capital allocation for each of these
rounds increases.
We should emphasize that in contrast to most of the preceding theoretical work on venture
capital, including Bergemann and Hege (1998), (2005), our model does not focus on the agency
costs but rather is concerned with convex investment costs. An advantage of the current model
is that it permits explicit solutions which allow us a variety of comparative static results that are
central for the empirical analysis. In the concluding section, we discuss at some length a variation
of the current model that considers an agency conict where the manager can divert the investment
ow to private consumption. We show that the resulting optimal incentive contract would lead to
similar theoretical predictions as the convex cost model. Overall, our analysis demonstrates that
other e¤ects besides agency, notably the gradual unraveling of uncertainty, can provide a robust
alternative explanation for stylized facts in venture nancing.
We take the theoretical predictions to a large sample of more than 47,000 venture capital
investments in the U.S. for the period 1987-2002, covering an overwhelming majority of all recorded
venture investments in the U.S. over that period1. The venture capital data are attractive for three
1We have compared our sample to the data of the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA (2008)) and the
PwC/Moneytree/Thomson Reuters survey data available from Thomson Reuters.
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reasons: rst, they allow us to study these e¤ects in a broad sample of projects across di¤erent
industries. Second, because of the staged nature of venture nancing, interim valuation data are
available that contain the estimates regarding the prospects of a particular project. We can use these
values and in particular changes in the valuations to extract information about what investors have
learnt since the last capital infusion. Third, the fact that venture-backed projects are independent
companies makes it possible to track the timing of the stopping decisions or the feedback between
information arrival and sequential investment decisions more accurately than, say, for research
projects launched within organizations in which there is more discretion for window-dressing and
the investment information is more opaque.
The results of our empirical investigation lend support to our theoretical predictions as follows.
First, we document empirically that as a project advances and the probability of eventual success
increases, investment ows are increasing. We show that at the same time, the returns of the
projects are decreasing over the investment cycle. Taken together, these two observations imply
that learning about the eventual prospect of a project are largely concentrated at the beginning
of the investment cycle. Second, our evidence shows that initially, investors seem to have little
screening ability about the eventual probability of success, but they seem to hold some information
about the nal value of the project in the event of a successful completion. We show that as the
project advances, in many cases investors get information that leads to a change in the estimated
failure risk or exit value of the project, as inferred from the dynamics of the project valuation.
Moreover, such information updates lead investors to adjust the investment path optimally: the
subsequent investment ow as well as the size of each round and the number of subsequent rounds
react in the way predicted by our model. Consistent with our model, we nd that investors receive
updates over the course of the investment cycle that allow them to better estimate the nal value.
These updates again give rise to a change in the investment ow and the number and size of
subsequent rounds that is consistent with the pattern predicted by our model. Third, we show that
the design of nancing rounds follows the optimal pattern predicted by our model: the investment
size and the investment ow is increasing from one round to the next, and projects with a high
initial estimate of the nal value or an optimistic appraisal of the probability to succeed will use
less rounds than less valuable or more risky projects.
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1.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to three di¤erent strands of the literature. First, there is a literature on the role
of learning in the nancing of innovation. Sorensen (2008) analyzes the decisions of venture capital
funds into which industry they invest. Using similar data to ours, he nds evidence that learning
and forward-looking expectations drive the investment decisions of the venture capital funds. In
Sorensen (2008), each fund makes many investment decisions across many industries. The past
investment experience in a given industry allows the venture capital fund to make inferences about
future ventures in this industry. The venture capital fund invests into a particular rm only once,
and the focus is on the informational externality across ventures. In contrast, we analyze the entire
investment cycle of every venture and follow the various funding decisions related to the project
over time. The focus of our theoretical and empirical investigation is about how information arrival
impacts the sequential funding policy within a venture whereas Sorensen (2008) analyze the funding
policy across ventures. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) discuss the learning
impact of a venture capitals past investments on the size and the direction of follow-up funds by the
same venture capital rm. They nd a positive feedback e¤ect between fund performance and the
size of follow-on funds. In contrast, we consider the interaction between learning and investment
within a single portfolio rm. Several papers discuss the optimal stopping decision in an investment
model with learning. Bergemann and Hege (2005) consider a project with a given failure risk in
which the arrival time of the nal discovery, and hence the total cost to deliver it, are uncertain.
Second, there is a literature on the optimal dynamic pattern of investments in the presence of
a real option to abandon. Berk, Green, and Naik (2004) focus on the evolution of the risk prole
that are due to changes from a purely technical risk in the early stages to more diverse sources
of risk in later stages. The theoretical literature on stage nancing in venture nance has mostly
focused on the use of stage nancing as a tool to alleviate agency problems. Cornelli and Yosha
(2003) show that stage nancing can mitigate the problem of an entrepreneur manipulating short-
term results for purposes of window-dressing. Fluck, Garrison, and Myers (2007) highlight the
role of stage nancing as a real option instrument. Neher (1999) addresses the possibility that an
entrepreneur strategically repudiates contractual obligations; in his model, stage nancing limits
the entrepreneurs bargaining power in each round and hence alleviates nancing constraints, but
it is costly as it delays the project. Neher (1999) appears to be the only paper prior to ours that
endogenizes the number of rounds and their investment volume. In contrast to our paper, Nehers
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model considers an investment without failure risk. A second essential assumption in Nehers model
is that all investments in past rounds lead to an increase in the liquidation value, whereas we allow
for the possibility that past investments are sunk and no value can be retrieved if the project is
abandoned before completion.
Our paper also bears some relationship to the recent continuous-time models of nancial con-
tracting where the cash ows are privately observed. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti,
Plantin, and Rochet (2007) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) show that the optimal security de-
sign in this context involves a securities mix of debt held by the nancier, of equity held by the
entrepreneur, and liquidation threats. Most interestingly for the context here, they show that the
contracts are non-stationary because of the need for a cushion to prevent ine¢ cient liquidation:
in Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007), cash is accumulated initially as a cash reserve;
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) introduce an initial credit line that is gradually paid down. Albu-
querque and Hopenhayn (2004) introduce a continuous working capital investment similar to our
paper, and nd that the investment ow is limited in the beginning because of constraints on the
maximum outside nancing that are imposed by incentive compatibility. All of these contributions
assume a continuous stream of uncertain cash ow, whereas we assume a single cash ow coupled
with failure risk. In spite of this di¤erence, we also nd that the funding limits are most severe at
the beginning of the project. While in the dynamic contracting papers, this e¤ect arises by initial
cash shortages, in our model it is driven by the compounded uncertainty about eventual success.
The di¤erence is highlighted by a moral hazard variation of our model that we discuss in the nal
section; it is close in spirit to the dynamic contracting papers but also di¤ers from them with its
focus on a continuous adjustment of the investment ow.
There is a substantial empirical literature on stage nancing, starting with the seminal analysis
of Gompers (1995) who explores the evolution and determinants of round investment ows, of
round investment volume, and of round durations. His key result is that duration and investment
volume per round relate to industry ratios, which he uses to measure agency and monitoring costs.
Our descriptive statistics conrm many of the staging patterns documented by Gompers (1995).
However, Gompers (1995) does not study the relationship between rm-level information arrival
and investment behavior, which is the central theme of our study, in particular how information
and learning a¤ects investment dynamics from round to round and round durations. Subsequent
work analyzes the contingent contract clauses that are either explicit or implied by staging in more
detail (see e.g. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003); Bienz and Hirsch (2007)). In contrast to our work,
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none of these earlier papers attempts to infer information about the learning that occurred since
the last nancing round (abnormal returns).
Finally, there is an extensive literature on the valuation and the returns in venture capital
which analyzes venture capital as an asset class and studies the returns of venture capital from a
performance-based perspective of a diversied investor. In this literature, notably Woodward and
Hall (2003) and Cochrane (2005), the round-level performance is determined as well, but with the
di¤erent objective of reducing selection bias problems. In contrast, we focus on the interaction
between information-driven returns and investments, and look at interim results and sequential
investments at the portfolio-company level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of investment
under uncertainty and describes the intertemporal payo¤s. Section 3 analyzes the optimal invest-
ment policies in the basic model. Section 4 augments the analysis in the baseline model to allow
for staging decisions and for additional uncertainty about the failure risk of the project. Section 5
develops the hypothesis for the empirical results given the theoretical predictions obtained in the
earlier sections. Section 6 describes the dataset and presents some summary statics of the dataset.
Section 7 reports the empirical results. Section 8 discusses some open issues and concludes. The
Appendix collects the proofs of all propositions in the main body of the text.
2 Model
The development of a new venture is described as a sequential investment model under uncertainty.
The true value of the venture or project is assumed to be initially unknown to the entrepreneur
and the investors. The true value of venture is either 0 or Y > 0. The uncertainty about the true
value of the venture is resolved over time.
We model the development of the venture as an investment process in continuous time t 2 [0;1).
The initial development of the project is given by state k0, with k0 > 0, and the development state
of the project at time t is denoted by kt. The venture is successful if it reaches a nal state K, with
k0 < K. If the venture reaches the state K then it generates a value Y . The role of the investment
at time t is to increase the state kt and bring the venture closer to a successful realization. Each
venture has a critical, but initially unknown, threshold k beyond which it cannot progress. If the
critical threshold k  K, then the project stalls as the current state kt reaches the threshold k,
or kt = k. In this case, the venture fails and the true value of the venture is determined to be 0.
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If on the other hand, the critical threshold k is beyond the nal state K, or k > K, then the
venture is developed successfully and generates the positive value Y .
The location of the critical threshold k, i.e. the breakdown point of the venture, is uncertain
and given by a prior distribution F (k). The venture has an ex ante chance of success if the
prior probability that the breakdown point k is smaller than K has probability less than one,
or F (K) < 1. Conversely, if 1   F (K) > 0, then the probability that the critical threshold is
beyond K, and hence occurs after the realization of the value Y , is positive. For the remainder of
the analysis we shall assume that the probability of a successful realization is positive, and hence
F (K) < 1. For the analysis, we shall restrict our attention to prior distributions which are in the
class of Pareto distributions.






The class of Pareto distributions is parameterized by two variables, k0 and . The initial state
of the project k0 is a strictly positive lower bound, and  > 0 identies the skewness of the
distribution. For notational ease, we shall suppress the dependence on k0 and  and simply write
F (k) , F (k; k0; ). The prior probability of success, starting at k0 is now given by:






Conversely, the prior probability that the project will fail during the development phase is given









The conditional failure rate is decreasing in the state of the project and a project with a larger 
has a uniformly higher rate of failure and consequently a lower prior (and posterior) probability
at every kt that it reaches the nal state K. With slight abuse of notation we frequently refer to
 as the failure rate of the venture. We postpone a detailed discussion of the specic role that
the Pareto distribution has for the results until immediately after the statement of the results.
It su¢ ces for the moment to say that the monotonicity and comparative static properties of the
optimal investment policy are independent of the parametrization of the failure risk. The properties
of the Pareto distribution are used only for the characterization of the intertemporal prole of the
observable returns. With respect to the specic class of distribution for the theoretical model, we
chose the Pareto distribution over the exponential distribution as the summary statistics of the
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venture suggested a decreasing rather than constant failure probability, as would be implied by the
class of exponential distributions.
The investment ow it at time t controls the rate at which the state of the development kt is




The current investment ow it increases the speed at which the project progresses in a concave
manner - or to put it di¤erently, increasing the speed increases the total cost of investment in
a convex manner. The concavity of the rate of progress dkt in the investment ow it acts like
a convex adjustment cost. It represents the presence of a critical resource, such as research or
management. The decision about the optimal speed of investment is therefore characterized by the
following trade-o¤: a larger investment ow into the project promises faster success, but reduces
the e¢ ciency of the investment. The parameter  > 0 describes the marginal e¤ect of investment
on the speed of development and a larger value of  represents a project that is easier to develop.
The instantaneous failure probability, given the current investment ow it, is given by:











A venture capital project is now described by (Y; k0;K; ; ). The value Y is the value of the
successfully developed project. The initial state k0 and nal state K describe the length of the
development process, K k0, until the venture can go public or be sold. The parameter  describes
the failure rate of the project and  identies the marginal productivity of the monetary funds to
develop the project.
The value of the venture depends on the investment policy (it)
T
t=0. From an ex ante point of
view, the project is expected to reveal itself to be either a success or a failure. If the project is a
success then the payo¤ Y will be realized at some future time T which depends on the prole of
the investment ow (it)
T
t=0. Along the way, the project requires investments which represent the
development cost. If, on the other hand, the project is a failure, and hence the critical threshold k
lies below K, or k < K, then the investment ow halts as soon as current state reaches kt = k.
In this case the project incurs development costs until the moment of failure and does not generate
any positive returns at all. Conditional on a given investment policy (it)
T
t=0, we associate to every
time t a position kt which is reached at time t, provided that the project did not come to halt
before kt. The ex ante expected net present value from an investment policy (it)
T
t=0 at time t = 0
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is given by:
(1  F (K)) e rTY  
Z T
0
it (1  F (kt)) e rtdt. (2)
The rst term represents the expected discounted gross return of the project. The ex ante proba-
bility of success is 1  F (K) and as the value Y is only realized at time T , the value is discounted
at the rate r until time T . The second term accounts for the expected cost of the investment policy
(it)
T
t=0 during the lifetime of the project. The investment it in state kt at time t occurs if and only if
the project has a critical threshold k beyond the current state kt which has an ex ante probability
1   F (kt) : The total expected cost of the project is the integral over the investment ows until
time T .
3 Sequential Investment
In this section we characterize the optimal investment policy for the project under uncertainty.
The optimal investment policy describes the rst best solution to the investment problem under
uncertainty. In consequence, at this stage, we are not concerned with possible agency conicts that
might arise between the investors and the entrepreneur. The focus of our analysis is to investigate
how the funding policy for the venture should optimally respond to the ow of information which
arises during the development of the venture. We analyze the role of the agency conict on the
funding policy in the next section, where the agency conict introduces a friction into the provision
of the funds.
The rst-best policy under uncertainty can be analyzed as a dynamic programming problem
under uncertainty. The natural state variable of the dynamic program is the state kt which describes
the progress of the project. At every point in time, the investment ow carries a cost equal to the
investment,  it, and generates one of two possible outcomes. The project may either fail at the
current position kt or it will pass successfully through the current position kt. In the event of
a failure, which occurs at the rate 
p
it  (=kt), the value of the project drops from the current
value, denoted by V (kt), to 0. In the event of a successful passage the state increases at the rate
dkt = 
p
it and the value of the venture increase by V 0 (kt). The dynamic programming equation
for the optimal investment policy in continuous time is now given by:














The value of the project depends on the ow of investment it in period t through three channels:
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(i) the direct cost of the investment it, (ii) the failure rate 
p
it  =kt, and (iii) the rate of change

p
it in the position of the project.
The rate of change 
p
it in the position kt is a concave function of the current investment it.
The optimal investment policy, therefore, is the result of an optimal trade-o¤ between the speed of
investment and the cost of building up the asset. The optimal investment at point kt is determined








V (kt)  V 0 (kt)

= 0,
The optimal investment problem is hence the solution to a linear-quadratic problem and the optimal












We can insert the optimal investment ow it into the value function (3) and obtain an ordinary












We observe from (4) and (5) that the optimal investment it is linear in the ow value of the venture
at time t :
it = rV (kt) . (6)
We can rewrite the di¤erential equation (5) in its canonical form as:








With a change of variable given by W (kt) ,
p
V (kt), we can transform the above di¤erential
equation into a nonlinear rst order di¤erential equation which we can solve explicitly by variation
of parameters. The explicit solution of the value function is given in the Appendix and we derive
the properties of the optimal investment policy i = (it )
T
t=0 on the basis of this solution.
Proposition 1 (Investment Policy)
1. The optimal investment policy i is increasing and convex in the state kt.
2. The optimal investment policy i is decreasing and concave in the failure rate .
3. The optimal investment policy i is increasing and convex in the nal value Y .
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The intuition of Proposition 1 is that the value of the project increases with the gradual resolu-
tion of uncertainty about its nal success. As the project proceeds, the likelihood that the critical
threshold k is reached before K diminishes and it becomes increasingly likely that the project
will reach the nal position K. As the current valuation of the venture increases, it is optimal to
increase the speed of development to reach the nal position K earlier because of the opportunity
cost of discounting. This increase in the funding occurs in spite of the associated convex increase
in the cost of investment. We noted earlier that the above monotonicity results are independent of
specic distributional assumptions about the failure risk. The curvature properties of the optimal
policies can be veried to hold for other distributions, such as the class of exponential distribu-
tions as well. However, if the failure rate is strongly non-monotone in the state kt, then the above
curvature properties may fail to hold.
We note that our model is built on a central premise: from the perspective of a risk-neutral
investor, the expected return of the investor is constant over time and given by
R , 1 + r.
In our model, the failure event is characterized by a fall of the value to zero. In the absence of a




The constant return R can therefore be decomposed into a return in the event of a failure, which is
given by 0, and the return in the event of a successful continuation, the surviving return, denoted
by Rt. We therefore have
R = Pr(failuret)  0 + Pr(survivalt)  Rt.



























Alternatively, we can express the surviving return Rt using the value function given in (3) and
describe the surviving return in terms of the net change in the continuation value _Vt   it relative





We can infer from (8) that the surviving return Rt is controlled by the product of the conditional
failure probability =kt and the investment intensity 
p
it. As the conditional failure probability
is declining in kt and kt is increasing over time, it follows that the conditional failure probability
is declining over time as well. This contributes to a decline in the surviving returns over time.
On the other hand, the investment intensity 
p
it is increasing over time. As we saw above, the
venture becomes more valuable as the successful completion of the project becomes more likely. The
intertemporal prole of the surviving return is then determined by the trade-o¤s between failure
rate and optimal responsiveness of the investment to the arrival of new information.
Proposition 2 (Surviving Returns)
1. The surviving returns Rt are decreasing over time if the failure rate  and the nal state K
are not too large.
2. The surviving returns Rt are increasing over time if the failure rate  and the nal state K
are too large.
The above characterization exhaustively describes the possible return proles of the venture
project. The surviving returns are either always decreasing or always increasing. The surviving
returns are increasing only if the failure rate and the nal state K are too large. In this situation,
the investment prole over time is exceedingly convex with very low investment ows until close
to the completion of the project. In this case the decreasing conditional failure probability is
overwhelmed by the rapid increase in the investment ow as a function of the state kt.
4 Staging and Learning
The objective of this section is to enrich the analysis of the basic sequential investment problem
to account for important aspects in the provision of venture capital funding. Specically, we (i)
introduce frictions that lead to a role for staging in the provision of the funds and (ii) analyze the
role of uncertainty about the true failure rate of the project.
13
4.1 Contracting Frictions and Staging
In the basic investment model, the ow of funds into the project was continuously adjusted in
response to the arrival of information. This suggests an ongoing and continuous involvement of the
investors during the development of the venture. In reality, the funding decisions and the associated
negotiations over the valuation of the venture only occur infrequently. Presumably, the transaction
costs brought about by multi-party bargaining, contracting and the valuation of the project leads
to a discrete number of funding decisions and funding rounds.
We represent the friction associated with the contracting and the agency relationship as a cost
proportional to the current project value. We assume that the negotiation for each new funding
round is successfully concluded with a probability p strictly less than one. With the complementary
probability, 1 p; an agreement fails to to be completed and the project is abandoned. Alternatively,
the probability 1  p can be viewed as a transaction cost due to a delay in the continuation of the
project. In this case, 1  p is the fraction of the value that is lost to discounting due to the delay
which comes with the (re-)negotiation of the funding terms.
While our model abstracts from explicit moral hazard considerations, the analysis of the staging
decision, or on the optimal degree of investor involvement, could be extended to address agency
problems in more detail. For example, we could assume that each time the investor advances
money to the manager of the venture, the amount transferred is fully handed over to the manager
and cannot be retrieved by current or future investors. E¤ectively, this adds a rich real options
dimension to the staging decision, in that the investor knows that the longer are individual stages,
the larger is the risk that a substantial amount of cash will be lost if a failure signal arrives in the
midst of a round. This extension would reinforce the downside of keeping individual stages too
long, which is currently represented by the impossibility to adjusting the funding speed within a
single round. However, this extension would not alter the trade-o¤ surrounding the staging decision
qualitatively. We therefore focus for simplicity only on the impossibility to adjust the investment
speed which is su¢ cient to generate the basic trade-o¤.
With this friction in the negotiation process, a continuous involvement in the investment process
becomes too costly for the investors. In fact, we show below that it becomes optimal to reevaluate
the investment policy only infrequently. In this world with friction, the optimal funding policy now
determines the funding volume over a time interval rather than a funding ow at every instant.
A decision about the funding volume therefore determines the constant ow i of the investment
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during the round and the length of the funding round.
Thus, we depict the staging decision as the result of a trade-o¤ between the transaction costs
of a new funding round versus the exibility to adjust the speed of investment. The objective of
the subsequent analysis is to understand the optimal structure of stage nancing based on this
trade-o¤. Importantly, the staging decision is fully endogenous in the sense that both the number
of stages as well as their duration are chosen by investors in reaction to their information at the
beginning of each round. Consequently, we denote by il;m the optimal investment ow in stage
l if the entire project is nanced in m stages, with l  m. Similarly, we denote by Vl;m (kt) the
value function of the project in stage l and state kt conditionally on funding the entire project in
m stages.
If the project is funded in a single stage, i.e. it is funded in the initial state k0 with the objective
of maintaining a given investment level i1;1 until the positive or negative termination of the object,
then the value function is given by the unique solution of the rst order di¤erential equation:





































The optimal investment policy given the initial state k0 can be obtained implicitly by the rst order
condition of V1;1 (k0) with respect to i1;1. The terms on the rhs of the equation represent the benet
and the cost of pursuing the project at a xed intensity level i1;1. The rst term represent the time
discounted probability that the project is successfully realized. The second term represents the
expected cost of developing the project.
We now consider the optimal determination of stage nancing. The value function V1;1 (kt) is
determined by the optimal investment funding to complete the venture in a single round starting
at kt. The cost of the stage funding is given by the commitment to a specic investment ow
over the round horizon. If the project is developing well, then the investors will react with the
infusion of new funds and a new, and presumably higher, investment ow. Given that a renewal
of the funding is not certain, but might lead to a failure of the project with probability 1  p, the
question then becomes, at which level of development kt does it become optimal to complete the
development of the venture in multiple rather than in a single stage of funding.
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Next, if the project is to be funded in two stages, then the optimal funding policy starting
at the initial position k0 has to make three distinct choices: (i) it has to determine the initial
funding level i1;2, (ii) the continued funding level i2;2 and (iii) the state k1 in which the funding
is supposed to be renewed. We can solve this problem recursively and for given state k1 determine
the optimal funding speed i2;2 to complete the project. The solution to this problem gives us
the value function V2;2 (k1) in state k1. We observe that the value function V2;2 (k1) shares the
functional form with V1;1 (k0) in (11). The only di¤erence between these two value functions is that
the associated investment level i1;1 is determined earlier at k0 rather than i2;2 at k1. But in either
case, the optimal investment choice provides the necessary funds in a single round until the project
is completed.
Given the optimal continuation value V2;2 (k1), we can recursively determine the funding level
i1;2 and the state k1 in which the funding will be reviewed. The joint decision about the funding
intensity i1;2 and the length of the funding period k1 is then given as the solution to the following
dynamic programming problem.





























We observe that the functional form of the dynamic programming equation is again similar
to (11). The di¤erence is that the expected gain from the investment ow i1;2 is the discounted
probability that the next funding round is reached in state k1, which is represented by V2;2 (k1).
Similarly, the investment costs are now accumulated between k0 and k1 at the rate of i1;2 rather
than between k0 and K at the rate of i1;1.
The optimal investment decision in each round is a joint optimal control and stopping problem.
The control problem is the determination of the investment ow il;m and the stopping problem is the
decision about the state kl at which a new funding decision should be made. As we are interested in
the interaction between the staging decision, the investment decisions, and the information arrival,
we seek to determine the optimal staging decision as a function of the current state kt and the
nal state K. In particular, we would like to know whether at a given position kt, it is optimal to
undertake the remaining investment for the interval K   kt in a single round or split it over two
rounds? In other words, we seek to determine how the length of the remaining task, identied by
K   kt, determines the staging decision. The comparative statics of this decision with respect to
K, gives us the required hypotheses for our empirical investigation.
We restrict our analysis here to the optimal determination of funding and renewal with two
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stages. Yet, due to the recursive structure of the funding problem, the optimality conditions and
the qualitative properties of the optimal funding decision extend naturally from two to nitely
many funding stages.
Proposition 3 (Optimality of Staging)
1. For a given nal state K, and for a given number of stages, m = 1 or m = 2, the respective
investment ows satisfy i1;2 < i1;1 < i2;2, i.e. the investment ow of the best one-round policy
is larger than the rst round and smaller than the second round investment ow of the best
two-round policy.
2. The number of optimal funding rounds is increasing in the length of interval of states of
development, K   k0.
The rst part of the above results demonstrates that the length of the development determines
the number of nancing rounds. In particular, as the length of the development process increases
the investors ultimately nd it in their interest to spread the funding decision over several rounds.
The second part of the result considers the structure of the funding conditional on either funding
the project in one or in two stages. Clearly, except for a critical value of the nal state K, either
one of the two staging policies will be optimal and dominate the other one. The result is meant
to illustrate the level of the funding policies across di¤erent staging policies. The outer inequality,
namely i1;2 < i2;2, reects the monotonicity in the funding policy which we established earlier for
the continuous control problem in Proposition 1. The inner inequalities, i1;2 < i1;1 < i2;2, reect the
exibility o¤ered by multiple stages. The investors can adjust the investment ow upwards as the
prospects of the project improve, whereas in a single stage they loose the exibility of the upward
adjustment and choose an investment ow which is in between the investment ows with multiple
stages. The relationship between the staging decision and the investment decision is depicted in
Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 Here
If the project is funded in a single stage, then the value function V1;1 is continuously increasing
until it reaches the terminal value Y . If on the other hand, the project is funded in two stages, then
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the increase in value is initially smaller as the initial investment is smaller and the project has still
to secure the second funding round. If at the stopping point k1, the funding for a second round
can be secured, then the associated value observes an upward jump from V1;2 (k1) to V2;2 (k1),
where the value before the jump, V1;2 (k1) ; and the value after the jump, V2;2 (k1) satisfy the
following relationship: V1;2 (k1) = pV2;2 (k1). Given the optimality of staging, we now investigate
the temporal structure of the staging. In particular, we are interested in the length of each staging
round as we come closer to a successful completion of the venture. Specically, we show that as the
length of the interval of the development states K   k0 increases then it is eventually optimal to
switch from a single stage funding to a multiple stage funding policy. As Figure 2 illustrates, the
advantage of the multiple stage funding policy is that it allows the investment ow to be adjusted
upwards as the project moves closer to completion.
Proposition 4 (Structure of Staging)
1. The number of funding stages is decreasing in Y and increasing in .
2. The length of the rst stage is increasing in the funding probability p.
3. For a given number of funding stages, the investment ow is increasing in Y in all funding
stages.
An implication of Proposition 3 is that a project with a larger return Y will see fewer rounds
of funding, as the delay or impasse resulting from a renewal of the funding leads to a higher
opportunity cost for a project with a larger possible return Y .
4.2 Learning
So far, we analyzed the dynamic development of the venture with an essentially binary information
structure. Either the project progresses and in consequence its prospect improve, or the venture
fails and the funding is terminated. In this nal extension we accommodate interim learning
while the project is developed. In particular, we consider learning during the project in the sense
that the progress of the project uncovers information that may change the expectation about the
future failure probabilities (or equivalently about the nal value in the event of success). The
interim arrival of information is interesting as the current development may give rise to additional
information about the expected future risk and value of the project. Consequently, we shall extend
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the basic model to accommodate the arrival of new information about the likelihood of success.
More specically, we assume that the venture starts with a given failure rate  > 0. At a random
time, the current failure rate  is replaced by a new failure rate, which can be either lower or higher
than the current failure rate , wit l <  < h.2 We shall assume that the expected true failure
rate is equal to the current failure rate, or
 = h + (1  )l.
The failure rate  can therefore be interpreted as the current estimate of the true, but currently
unknown failure rate which is given by h with probability  and l with probability 1   . We
observe that a jump to lower failure rate l represents a positive shock from the point of view of
the investors, and conversely an upwards jump to h represents a negative shock as it lowers the
expected value of the venture. The new information about the failure rate is assumed to arrive
with a constant rate . The dynamic investment problem can is represented by the usual dynamic
programming equation:










V (kt) +  ((1  )Vl (kt) + Vh (kt)  V (kt))

. (13)
The investment problem represented by (13) is similar to the earlier model, with the exception of
the additional jump terms Vl (kt) and Vh (kt). The value functions represent the continuation value
of the venture conditional on knowing that the true failure rate is either l or h, respectively.
While the continuation values, Vl (kt) and Vh (kt), have the same form as the value function in the
basic model, the value function before the resolution of uncertainty about the true failure rate, l or
h, does not permit an explicit solution as it contains the possibility of a jump to a di¤erent failure
rate. Nonetheless, the implicit solution allows us to obtain a number of important comparative
static results.
Proposition 5 (Survival Probability and Investment)
A positive shock at kt that reduces the expected failure rate  to a lower failure rate l leads to:
1. an increase in the probability of eventual success, 1  F (K; kt); and
2. an upward jump in the investment ow, it, that persists until the project is either completed
or abandoned.
2The focus on learning about  will be motivated below in the empirical discussion.
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A decrease in the failure risk leads to a higher probability of success. As this leads to an upward
jump in the value of the venture, the optimal investment policy is adjusted as well. As we saw
earlier that the investment policy is a linear function of the value of the venture, the decrease in
the failure probability leads to an upward jump in the investment ow.
5 Hypothesis Development
In this section, we summarize the hypotheses of our theoretical model in order to confront them
with venture capital evidence.
Valuation, Time of Information Arrival, and Return Dynamics We can use our model
to explore typical patterns of learning in venture-backed investment projects. Prior to launching
a project, investors hold beliefs about the prospects (e.g. nal value at exit) and the risks of
the project, but they may also receive information after the project is launched. We distinguish
between three hypotheses regarding the arrival of information: (i) in the uninformed investor
hypothesis, the investors cannot discriminate between the prospects of individual projects and
use the expected values for failure risk and the value of success; (ii) in the ex ante information
hypothesis, the investors can discriminate between the prospects of individual rms and the bulk
of the information is available at the project launch; (iii) in the interim information hypothesis,
the investors obtain valuable information on the project terminal value and failure risk over the
course of the investment cycle.
We distinguish between these hypotheses by using the initial valuations and the evolution of the
valuations over the venture capital investment cycle. We start from the premise that, at the time of
inception, the value of innovative projects consists essentially of the expectation of the future value
of the project in the event of success. They typically have little or no assets. Therefore, variations
in the present value of the project are mainly explained by di¤erences in the expected nal value
at exit if the venture is successful, or the estimated probability of success.
Hypothesis 1A: If the uninformed investor hypothesis holds, the initial project value should show
no relation with the ultimate success probability and the nal value. There should also be no relation
between value increases during the investment cycle (high abnormal returns) and the ultimate success
probability or the nal value.
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Hypothesis 1B: If the ex ante information hypothesis holds, the initial project value should be
positively correlated with the ultimate success probability and the nal value.
Hypothesis 1C: If the interim information hypothesis holds, the initial value of the rm and the
ultimate success should be uncorrelated, and there should be no correlation between initial and nal
value. On the other hand, projects with a large value increase during the investment cycle (high
abnormal returns) should be more likely to succeed and be linked to higher exit values.
The logic is that if the investor has ex ante information on the failure risk or nal value, this
should be impounded in the initial project valuation. If the essential part of the information on
failure risk or nal value is only learnt once the project is under way, it should lead to higher
valuations during the project development, and hence to abnormal returns. We can investigate this
hypothesis by analyzing the correlations suggested in our hypotheses. Thus, we can discriminate
between the uninformed investor and the interim information hypothesis by analyzing the relation-
ship between ex ante valuations, interim valuations and ultimate success, i.e. by comparing the
predictive power of initial and interim valuations relative to nal outcomes. The same is true for
the relationship between investment behavior (e.g. investment ow following the rst round) and
nal outcome (e.g. IPO, M&A, or failure).
Our model also allows us to analyze the dynamics of the failure risk over the investment cycle.
Our model is based on the premise of a risk-neutral investor which implies constant expected returns
over the lifetime of the project. That is, in a risk-neutral setting the value increase in each round
is just an adequate compensation for the failure risk, and hence should decrease as the project is
developed to maturity.3 Following Proposition 2, we can write:
Hypothesis 2: If the conditional hazard rate at which venture projects are expected to be abandoned
falls at a su¢ ciently high rate, then the survival probabilities increase and the surviving returns
decrease over time; and vice versa if the hazard rate is constant or falling at a low rate.
This hypothesis is interesting because it allows us to back out an original inference on the time
pattern of the information ow in a typical venture. For the sake of the argument and in contrast
3 If the investors were risk-averse, then the expected or unconditional returns should be decreasing as the project
matures, given that the failure risk decreases. The magnitude of this e¤ect may not be large for moderate levels of
risk aversion. This appears to be roughly consistent with our nding of decreasing means in the expected returns.
Our (weak) result of increasing medians contradicts the hypothesis that investors are risk-averse.
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to our assumption, suppose for a moment that the hazard rate of the critical threshold k at which
the project fails is constant. With the increase in investment ows, this would imply an increasing
speed in the discovery process over time and hence an increase in the surviving returns of the
project, since the return is just an adequate compensation for the dynamics of the failure risk. This
thought experiment underlines the strong implications contained in the following two elements of
our empirical analysis: (i) the investment ows are increasing over time and (ii) the surviving
returns generally decrease from one round to the next. We conclude that these two observations
can only be reconciled if there is a su¢ ciently steep decline of the conditional hazard rate of failure,
a condition that is satised in our model with a su¢ ciently large value of the Pareto distribution
parameter  (Proposition 2).
Investment Flow Our model shows that investments optimally react to the ow of information,
and that investment ows will increase if there is less uncertainty about the project outcome. In
particular, our model explains that as a venture project matures, it should exhibit larger invest-
ments, and higher outlays over any given period of time. Section 4 extends our model to allow for
the interim information hypothesis, exploring the possibility that there is interim learning about
the failure risk  of the project. A lower  means an increase in the current value of the project Vt,
and hence a positive abnormal return at the time the good news is received. Following Proposition
5, if the rm learns positive news about , then the investment ow should optimally increase
thereafter, and the project be completed faster. The inverse relationship holds if the rm receives
bad news about . Thus, the relevant prediction of our model is:
Hypothesis 3: There should be a positive relationship between project valuation and investment
ow throughout the investment cycle; all subsequent investment ows should increase after a positive
abnormal return.
The rst relation holds whether the rms value is high because the nal value Y is high or
because the failure rate  is low, or both. The reason is that both a higher nal value and a lower
failure risk translate into a larger present value of the project, and the model shows that a projects
investment ow is closely linked to the current project valuation. Therefore, we expect to nd that
the investment ow is increasing both in measures of the expected nal value and the expected
failure risk.
Concerning interim information, the same argument would hold if there were interim learning
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about the nal value of the project Y . Good news about Y translates into an increase in the current
value and hence a positive abnormal return, and at the same time leads to an upwards adjustment
in the optimal investment ow.
Staging Frequency Section 4 explicitly considers that funding may be provided in lumpy
amounts even though investments are made continuously. The renewal of the funding decision
enhances the value of the real option to abandon the project. Our analysis shows that shorter
nancing rounds will occur if the information that investing produces is more valuable for the
abandonment decision. In particular, the model explains that the staging frequency should be
lower for projects with a higher success probability.
Contracting costs in our model are proportional to the current project value. The analysis shows
that the staging frequency should be lower for projects with a high expected exit value. The reason
is that the expected loss of adding one round increases in the expected nal value, whereas the
potential savings if there is early abandonment are constant. Considering interim learning about
the projects failure risk, a reduction in the estimated failure probability  means, rst, an increase
in the current project value and and hence in the abnormal return. At the same time, in reaction
to an increase of the value of the rm, the subsequent nancing will be undertaken in fewer rounds.
Thus, we expect:
Hypothesis 4: The number of rounds is expected to decrease in the initial value of the project, and
the number of subsequent rounds until successful completion to decrease after a positive abnormal
return.
Size and Duration of Financing Rounds and Projects A separate set of predictions ad-
dresses the duration and capital raised in each nancing round. The real option of abandonment
is most valuable when the uncertainty about ultimate success is high. As shown in Section 4, as
the project advances and investors become more condent about ultimate success, they are willing
to travel a longer distance [kl; kl+1) in a single nancing round l. Moreover, our model predicts
that the capital raised in a round is a decreasing function of the failure rate , and an increasing
function of the expected nal value Y and the transaction costs of an additional round, 1  p. At
the same time, the investment ow increases in Y and decreases in . Therefore, the model predicts
that the investment size increases in Y and decreases in . At the same time, the impact on round
duration is ambiguous. If the investment ow were constant, then the round duration would also be
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increasing. However, as Proposition 5 shows, the optimal funding ow/intensity also increases from
one round to the next. Therefore, the overall impact on round durations is ambiguous, and they
could increase as well as decrease as the project advances. Thus, the model leads to the following
prediction:
Hypothesis 5: The size or the volume of the investment rounds should be increasing from one
round to the next. The investment volume also should increase in the initial value of the project,
and it should increase after a positive shock. By contrast, the dynamic pattern of round durations,
and the relation between round durations and initial values after positive shocks are indeterminate.
Our model also implies that projects with an above-average initial valuation have consistently
higher investment ows. Therefore, the model predicts that they are completed faster.
6 Data Description and Empirical Methodology
Our data of venture capital investments are provided by Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE) and contain
the majority of US investments in the period from January 1987 to March 2002. SHE combines
and extends two databases, VentureXpert (formerly Venture Economics) and Venture One, which
are extensively used in the venture capital literature. According to Gompers and Lerner (1999)
and Kaplan, Stromberg, and Sensoy (2002), the VentureXpert data contain the majority of the
investments. SHE has spent substantial time and e¤ort to ensure the accuracy of the data. This
includes removing investment rounds that did not actually occur, adding investment rounds that
were not in the original data, and consolidating rounds, so that each round corresponds to a
single actual investment by one or more venture capitalists. Cochrane (2005), Sorensen (2008) and
Korteweg and Sorensen (2008) use di¤erent versions of this data set. The data in Cochrane (2005)
end in June 2000 and the data in Korteweg and Sorensen (2008) and Sorensen (2008) end in 2005.
The data contains rm level information and venture capital investment round level information.
At the rm level, we focus on the following variables: a unique rm ID, industry category (health
care, IT, retail, or others), and the exit type (IPO, merger & acquisition, out of business, restart or
unknown). A rm with unknown exit may be alive at the end of the sample period or exited at a
unknown time point before March 2002. The round observations are linked to rms via the unique
rm IDs. At the round level, we use the following variables for each round: the date stamp of the
round, the business status of the rm during the current round (start up, in development, beta-
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testing, in clinical trails, shipping, protable, restart, or unknown), the amount (million dollars)
raised in the current round, post money valuation of the rm and an exit dummy that equals one if
the current round is an exit round. We also use the round status (seed, rst, early, late, mezzanine,
restart, IPO, acquisition, busted round, or unknown). While round status classications are
frequently tricky to make, all that matters for our purposes is that they correctly indicate the
sequence of investments. Therefore, we verify manually that no round status classications is
erroneous - that is, rounds labeled as seed or rst always precede early rounds, early
rounds precede laterounds, etc.
We lter the data by keeping rms that have at least one round before the exiting round,
removing rms that exit as a restart or have restart rounds. We further aggregate the business
status information by combining in development, beta-testing, and in clinical trails as one status
called in development, and combining shipping, protable as in production.
An important issue is that only accurate valuation data allow us to estimate error-free returns.
It is well-known that valuation data for venture capital su¤er from a variety of errors. For example,
these data typically do not take into account covenants and contingent contract provisions which
can dramatically a¤ect the valuation levels (Kaplan, Stromberg, and Sensoy (2002) and Metrick
(2007)). Moreover, intermediate nancing rounds are often missing or investments are reported
without a valuation, or the exit status is missing or wrongly reported (Kaplan, Stromberg, and
Sensoy (2002)). While Sandhill Econometrics has undertaken a considerable amount of e¤ort to
remedy these problems and our data presumably fare better in this respect than data bases such
as Venture One or VentureXpert, it is likely that our data are still a¤ected by these issues and,
therefore, must be considered as noisy. However, the only assumption that we really need for the
validity of our ndings is that any noise in valuation data is uncorrelated with the variation in
the data that is driven by venture characteristics explained in our model. In addition, the size
and representativeness of our sample makes us condent that our main ndings are not driven by
measurement problems or missing data issues.
Finally, it is well known that venture capital valuations are subject to large uctuations over
time and across industries (Gompers and Lerner (2000); Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein
(2008); Ljungqvist, Richardson, and Wolfenzon (2007)). Market uctuations can also lead to large
di¤erences in values between the time a venture capitalist starts exiting from a venture (e.g., in an
IPO) and the time when the last part of the investment is sold. For these reasons, we consider only
the abnormal returns that are not explained by the typical value gains of comparable ventures at
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the same time, thus controlling for cyclical and industry-specic valuation e¤ects (see Section 7 for
details).
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the rms in the data. Panel A reports the break-down
of the rms according to industries and exits. It shows the typical composition of venture capital
samples, with more than half of the companies in IT-related activities, 15% in health care and 9%
in retail. Around 70% of the companies have unknown exits, and 25% exited via either IPO or a
trade sale. Panels B and C report average round frequencies and round durations, respectively, for
the same breakdown.
While some of the rms with unknown exits might be alive at the end of the sample period,
many others might have already been liquidated by then. Failures are incompletely documented in
the data because liquidation is less visible than IPOs or trade sales. If rms with unknown exits
are more likely to be already liquidated than alive, excluding all rms with unknown exits from our
analysis would lead to a biased sample of venture capital backed rms that overrepresents successful
ventures. Further, if the rms with a documented failure systematically di¤er from rms that have
been liquidated but do not have a documented failure, excluding all rms with unknown exits would
lead to biased results, particularly concerning the analysis of the determinants of exit types and
nal values of venture capital backed rms. To mitigate the possible sample selection bias, we
distinguish zombies- rms that were liquidated before March 2002 but have no documented exit
in the data set - from rms with unknown exits. Specically, for each rm with unknown exit,
we estimate the length of the period (in months) for which the capital raised in the last recorded
round would keep a rm alive. If the duration between the last recorded round and March 2002 is
longer than this survival time, we assume the rm went down at the end of the survival time.
Otherwise, we assume that the rm is alive at the end of the sample period. The empirical analysis
in this paper uses not only rms with documented exits but also rms with estimated exits.
We use the following procedure to estimate the survival timeafter the last recorded round for
rms with unknown exits. First, we estimate the amount of capital consumed per month after the
last recorded round for each rm. Second, we divide the raised amount in the last recorded round
with the estimated monthly capital consumption, and obtain the survival timein months. In the
rst step, we run a round level regression of monthly capital consumption (raised capital divided
by the number of months between the current and next rounds, in log) for all rounds except the
last recorded rounds, on the amount of capital raised (in log), the post money valuation (in log),
industry dummies, business status dummies, and dummies for future exit types. The rationale is
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that the amount of capital consumed per month by a rm is determined by the amount of capital
raised, the size of the rm, the industry and business status of the rm, and the quality of the rm
(proxied by the nal exit type). The R2 of the regression is 0.75, which seems to indicate that
the monthly capital consumption is explained reasonably well by this regression. The regression
results suggest that the amount of capital raised and the post money valuation are positive and
signicant at the 1% level, which indicates that larger rms consume more capital per month and
rms with more capital raised consume more capital per month. In addition, retail rms consume
more capital per month than rms in other industries, which is signicant also at the 1% level.
Firms in development and in production consume less capital than start up rms, which is
signicant at the 1% level. Moreover, exit type dummies also have signicant coe¢ cients. We run
another regression with the post money valuation excluded, and obtain similar results and a R2 of
0.74. After running these two regressions, we estimate the amount of capital consumed per month
after the last recorded rounds for rms with unknown exits, using estimated coe¢ cients from the
regressions and the explanatory variables for the last recorded rounds. We use the coe¢ cients from
the rst regression for the last recorded rounds with post money valuations observed, and use the
coe¢ cients from the second regression for rounds with unobserved post money valuations. We set
the exit dummies to 0, assuming that the rmsexits would follow the same distribution of exits
as the exited rms. In the second step, we divide the raised amount with the estimated capital
consumption per month, and obtain the survival time.If the survival time is long enough to go
beyond the end of the sample period, we assume that the rm is alive. If the survival time ends
before the end of the sample period, we add an exit round for the rm, assuming that this rm
raised $0 in the exit round, and went down with $1 post money valuation.
The results of this reclassication procedure are recorded in the two lines (in italics) at the
bottom of each of the Panels A, B and C of Table 1. These lines report the same data as in the two
preceding lines (Downand Unknown) of each panel, but use the procedure discussed above to
classify rms with exit status Unknownas either Downor Alive. As expected, the number
of liquidated rms (reported and estimated Downs) increases dramatically - from 938 in Table
1 to 10,857, bringing the total of failed rms to 57.3%. 17.9% of rms are now estimated to be
still active or alive, and in 10.6% of rms the venture capitalists exited with an IPO, in 14.5%
with a trade sale. The summary statistics for pre-exit rounds and duration before exits also show
comparable di¤erences that make them more sensible compared with the raw data (for instance,
Downrms no longer exhibit a longer duration and more rounds).
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Starting with Table 2, all the tables and analysis are based on rms with estimated exits
whenever the exits are unknown. Table 2 reports summary statistics for venture capital investment
rounds prior to rmsexits. Panel A reports the number of rounds for rms with di¤erent exit types
in di¤erent industries. Panels B, C, and D report the means and standard deviations, which are
calculated using rounds with corresponding information available, of pre-nancing duration (the
number of months between the previous round and the current round), investment amount (million
dollars), and the ratio of investment amount to post-money valuation. The table shows that the
pre-nancing duration, investment amount, and the ratio of investment amount to post-money
valuation are similar across industries and di¤erent exit types.
7 Empirical Results
Initial Valuation, Time of Information Arrival, and Return Dynamics We begin by
exploring our alternative hypotheses concerning the typical arrival time of information that are
summarized in our Hypothesis 1. Table 3 reports evidence from a comparison of successful projects
(rms exiting via IPO or M&A) and unsuccessful ones (rms that are going down). Under the
ex ante information hypothesis, valuable information about the prospects of a particular project
is mostly known ex ante. If the information were about the success probability, then we would
expect projects with higher initial values to succeed more often. As Table 3 shows, this is not
the case: successful projects actually have lower initial values compared with unsuccessful ones.
Moreover, when we look at investment behavior we also nd evidence that is inconsistent with the
ex ante information hypothesis. Table 3 shows that there is no signicant di¤erence in investment
behavior between failed and successful projects. First-round investments and the ratio of rst-round
investment to initial value are fairly constant across projects, regardless of their ultimate outcome.
Further, under the ex ante information hypothesis, the rst round investment ow, which reects
investorsex ante belief of the nal exits, should help predict the prospect of the project: a larger
investment ow indicates a higher probability of success. Table 3 shows the opposite: IPO/M&A
rms have smaller rst round investment ows than rms that went down.
Additional evidence is provided by Table 4, which presents results of probit regressions on
whether rms exit successfully (IPO or M&A) or exit as failures (including estimated failures). The
initial value is not signicant or - in one regression - is weakly signicant but with the wrong sign
according to the ex ante information hypothesis. Thus, the results about initial valuation and initial
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investment behavior resolutely reject the hypothesis that investors have ex ante discriminatory
capabilities about the estimated success probability of a project.
We can also test whether investors hold relevant ex ante information about the expected nal
value in the case of success. Indeed, initial values and nal values are correlated, and Table 5 shows
that the initial value has clear predictive power for the exit value (signicant at the 1% level) in
the event of success. Hence we can conclude that investors have some ex ante information about
potential nal values, but not about the chances to succeed.
According to the interim information hypothesis formulated in Hypothesis 1C, the estimates
about the ultimate success probability and/or the exit value of the project evolve with the progress
of the project. In many of our tests of the interim information hypothesis, we focus on the infor-
mation content in the rst round for which we have the most observations. From now on, we use
the abnormal return from one round to the next to measure the information content of that round.
We dene the abnormal return as the component of the raw return that is orthogonal to the in-
formation already known by investors before the round, including the industry and business status
of the project and the status of the round, and the common return of the whole venture capital
asset class. The common return is assumed to be driven by the nancial market instead of the
specic prospect of the underlying project. As a result, the abnormal return captures information
regarding the specic project that is unknown before the round.








The subscript i; tk+1 denotes the month in which round k + 1 is raised for rm i; Ii;tk+1 is the
amount of capital raised in round k+1; Vi;tk+1 is the post money value for round k+1; Industryi is
a 3 1 vector of dummies corresponding to health care, IT, and retail rms; Businessi is a (3 1)
vector of dummies corresponding to start up, in development, and in production; log(Rm;s) is the
log venture capital market returns, which is assumed to be a¤ected by a vector of unknown market
factors that vary over time and factor loadings that are constant for all venture capital investments;
"i;k is the portion of the log return that is not explained by market factors or information already
known by investors, and thus is the abnormal return. Note that in the regression, log(Rm;s) is
essentially the coe¢ cient of a dummy variable for month s. The regression is similar to the repeat
sales regression for the construction of real estate price indexes.4 We pool all rounds in the data
4See Bailey, Muth, and Nourseerk (1963) for the original regression and Goetzmann and Peng (2006), among
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set without missing variables and run the above regression. The monthly abnormal log return






As Table 3 shows, one of the most powerful results of our study is that projects that ultimately
succeed are likely to receive a positive news update during the initial nancing round. The ab-
normal return following the rst round is strongly positive for projects that exit successfully, and
signicantly negative for all other rms (t-value for the di¤erence: 25.335). The probit analysis
in Table 4 conrms this e¤ect when including other explanatory variables with a comparable level
of signicance. In addition, consistent with the hypothesis that interim information also updates
the belief about the nal value, Table 5 shows that the abnormal return following the rst round
is positively related to the exit value. Taken together, these results provide solid support for the
interim information hypothesis.
We conclude that investors learn during the rst investment round about the failure probability.
In fact, information arrival after the launch of a project, more precisely during the rst round, is a
strong predictor of ultimate success, as opposed to ex ante information (initial valuations or rst-
round investment behavior). In addition, investors also learn about the nal value, but parts of
their expectation of exit values seems to be ex ante knowledge. The last regression in Table 5 shows
that in fact both ex ante information (contained in the initial value) as well as interim information
(contained in ARi;2) explain the nal value. In other words, the nal value of a project seems to
be partially contained in the ex ante information, and partially to be the result of interim learning
as expressed in the abnormal returns over the projects investment cycle.
We turn to the exploration of the dynamics of risk and return for which the theoretical pre-
dictions are expressed in Hypothesis 2. Our basic model assumes that, conditional on survival,
the risk of failure is decreasing, as captured by the parameter  of the Pareto distribution.5 Panel
A of Table 6 appears to lend some support to the assumption of decreasing failure risk since it
shows that the survival probability is increasing over time. To test formally whether later rounds
others, for an application to real-estate markets.
5 It is interesting to compare these ndings to earlier studies that have looked at the cross-sectional distribution
of payo¤s derived from patent grants. Scherer and Harho¤ (2000) found that they are poorly described by a Pareto
distribution. Since we are looking exclusively at the distribution of failure risk of ventures over time, there is no
contradiction between our evidence on the longitudinal distribution and the cross-sectional results by Scherer and
Harho¤ (2000).
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have higher survival probabilities, we employ round level probit analyses, using a binary depen-
dent variable that equals 1 for surviving rounds and 0 for failing rounds. The main coe¢ cients
are reported in Panel B of Table 6, showing that early and late rounds (second and third rounds)
have signicantly higher survival probabilities than rst/seed rounds (rst rounds), and late rounds
(third rounds) have signicantly higher probabilities than all other rounds, including early rounds
(second rounds).6
Note that while information content in a round is better measured by abnormal returns, raw
returns seem a more appropriate measure for the total failure risk, including the expected and
not expected (learned) components. Our learning model implies that round returns for surviving
companies should show a decreasing trend as the failure risk subsides. This is indeed the case, as
Table 6 shows. In other words, our empirical investigation reveals that venture capital practitioner
are right when they use higher discount rates in rstand seedrounds, in order to compensate
for a perceived larger risk. The results in Table 6 are in fact even more supportive of our model
than these numbers suggest: the probabilities express the average fraction of surviving projects in
each round. Our model, however, predicts the survival probability in terms of units of the [0;K]-
investment cycle, which is the survival probability per invested dollar. Table 7 lends support to our
premise of risk-neutral investors, which implies that unconditional expected returns are constant.
We nd that the means of the unconditional returns are increasing over time whereas the median
returns are decreasing. Therefore, we conclude that it is di¢ cult to reject the hypothesis of constant
expected returns on which our risk-neutral model is based.7
Investment Flows We turn to our predictions on investment ow (investment spending per
month) that are compiled in Hypothesis 3. Our model leads to the prediction that investment
ows are inversely related to a projects estimated failure risk . We do not observe estimated or
actual failure risk  directly, but can approximate them in two ways. First, we observe the ultimate
project outcome, which is determined by the actual failure risk. Note that the ex ante information
hypothesis indicates that investorsestimated failure risk should correlate with the actual failure
risk. If the ex ante information hypothesis is correct, we should expect ultimately successful exits
6The main explanatory variables are dummies that equal 1 for all early and late rounds (left column) or all second
and third rounds (right column), respectively dummies that equal 1 for all late rounds (left column) or all third
rounds (right column). We also include industry dummies and dummies for the months when the rounds were raised.
7This is certainly not a conclusive test on the question whether venture investors are indeed risk-neutral (see e.g.
Gompers (1996) for a discussion), but it lends support to our simplifying model assumption of risk-neutral investors.
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(via IPO or trade sale) to be more likely for projects with an above-average investment ow. As
the rst three regressions in Table 4 show, there is no evidence for this e¤ect. A possible indirect
measure of the estimated failure risk  is the ratio of nal value to initial value. Should the ex
ante information hypothesis be true, then the higher the ratio, the larger would be the expected
cumulative failure probability and hence . Again, our regression results are not signicant (and
thus not reported in our tables). Therefore, consistent with our earlier results, Table 4 provides
strong evidence that investors have no ex ante information regarding the chance of success.
According to Hypothesis 3, the investment ow should also increase with the expected nal
value of the project. Assuming that the investors hold ex ante information regarding the nal
values, a test is only possible for successfully completed projects, using their actually realized exit
values as a proxy for expected nal values. Regression 3 in Table 5 presents the results for this
test, which seem to support our hypothesis: the coe¢ cient of the rst round investment ow is
signicant at the 1% level. We conclude that investors seem to have some ex ante information
regarding the expected exit values.
In our model, the investment ow reacts to uncertainty, and it will optimally increase if there
is less uncertainty about the ultimate project outcome. Table 8 provides strong support for this
hypothesis (at the 1% level for both means and medians). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, investment
ows are increasing over time. Table 8 also shows that venture projects exhibit larger investment
volumes as they advance from one round to the next (at 1% level for both means and medians).
Additional predictions on the investment ow which imply multivariate relationships are tested
using OLS regressions; the evidence is provided in Tables 9 and 10. First, the model predicts that the
investment ow increases in the valuation of the project, and implies that this positive relationship
holds for the rst as well as later rounds of the investment process. In Table 9, regressions for all
rms (unconditional) and IPO and M&A rms substantiate this positive relationship for the rst
round. Further, since investors have ex ante information about the nal value of the project, which
is supported by our earlier results in Table 5, nal values should positively correlate with the initial
investment ow. This is indeed the case, as the conditional regressions in Table 9 show. Table 10
provides evidence that the positive correlation between project valuation and investment ow holds
throughout the investment process. In Table 10, regressions 2 and 5 show strong evidence for this
e¤ect (signicant at 1% level). It is useful to note that we use the pre-money company value at the
beginning of each round. Regressions 3 and 5 in Table 10 show that the optimal investment ows
are autocorrelated and thus persistent throughout the project investment cycle (signicant at 1%
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level). This is consistent with our model which predicts the persistence of the autocorrelation as a
mirror image of the evolution of project valuation over time. We observe that the regressions 4 and
5 control for the sunk cost (the total investment amount raised before) of investors in rms, which
would be signicant if investors are not willing to realize losses and tend to continue nancing bad
projects. While the sunk cost is signicant in regression 4, it is not signicant in regression 5,
which includes the lagged rm value, the lagged investment ow, and the lagged abnormal return.
Note that, in Table 10, we use dummies to control for mezzanine rounds because they are likely
bridge nancing rounds prior to successful exits, and may not reect the learning phase of the
project.
Hypothesis 3 also summarizes the predictions about the investment ows stemming from the
interim information hypothesis for which we already presented supportive evidence. If this hy-
pothesis is true then it has clear implications for investment behavior that can easily be tested:
investment ow should be increasing in the most recent abnormal return in each round that we use
as a proxy for interim information. If the last observed abnormal return ARi;k is higher, then the
project should have received a more positive information update. All regressions in Table 10 sup-
port this prediction, and show strong evidence consistent with the interim information hypothesis.
The e¤ect seems to have a concave shape as the quadratic term for the abnormal return is negative
and highly signicant as well.
Staging Frequency Our predictions on the determinants of the round frequency are compiled in
Hypothesis 4. Our model implies that larger nancing rounds will occur if there is less uncertainty
resolved for every dollar of investment. It predicts that the staging frequency should be lower for
projects with a high success probability.
To test this hypothesis, we need to turn to regressions for completed projects that explain the
number of rounds over the entire investment cycle. Since we do not observe the risk variable 
directly, we use the ratio of exit value to initial value for completed projects as a proxy, and assume
that investors have ex ante information regarding nal values, which is supported by our earlier
evidence. The rst line in Table 11 shows the results, with the total number of nancing rounds
as a dependent variable. In all regressions in Table 11, there is a positive and highly signicant
sign (at 1% level) for our proxy for . Moreover, our theoretical results imply a negative sign when
we regress the number of rounds on the nal value. Regressions 3 and 4 of Table 11 show indeed
strong evidence (signicant at 1% level) in favor of this hypothesis.
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Considering interim learning about the projects failure risk or nal value, we predict that
a positive information release that makes the project more valuable or less risky leads to less
subsequent nancing rounds. As regressions 2 and 4 in Table 11 show, this is indeed the case. The
relationship is again nonlinear, as witnessed by the quadratic terms of ARi;2.
Size and Duration of Financing Rounds Our model leads to very clear predictions on the
investment size (capital raised) of each nancing round as summarized in Hypothesis 5. The
model predicts that it is increasing from one round to the next. This is indeed the case for the
means and the medians of the investment volume, as Panel B of Table 8 shows. By contrast,
Hypothesis 5 discusses that the predictions on round duration (in months) of each nancing round
are ambiguous, since increasing investment volume (the dollar amount provided in a given round)
and investment ow have countervailing e¤ects on the round duration. Interestingly, we do not
nd any clear patterns for round durations (not reported in tables), consistent with our models
ambiguous predictions for round duration.
As expressed in Hypothesis 5, a higher project valuation, reecting either a high expected nal
value or a low expected failure probability, should translate into a larger investment volume in every
round. The result of our regression analysis are presented in Table 12. We nd strong evidence
in favor of this hypothesis as regressions 2 and 5 show. Also, an above-average investment size
in round k   1, explained by a high exit value, low failure probability or high contracting cost,
should translate into an above-average investment volume in round k. This is indeed the case, as
the positive and signicant signs for variable log(investmenti;k 1) in Table 12 (regressions 3 and
5) shows. Note that we control for the sunk cost and mezzanine rounds in this table as well.
We also explore the implications of the interim information hypothesis for investment volume.
The model implies that positive interim information releases should lead to an increase in the
capital raised in each subsequent round. This is indeed the case as the highly signicant and
positive coe¢ cient on the interim learning variable ARi;2 shows in Table 13, which again exhibits
a nonlinear e¤ect.
Finally, in the closing paragraph of our hypothesis section (Section 5) we discuss that projects
with an above-average initial valuation should be completed faster according to our model, as
they benet from a persistently higher investment ow. We nd clear evidence in support of this
prediction in Table 13. Table 13 further substantiates that favorable information updates, which
are proxied by abnormal returns, and lower failure risk, which is proxied by the reciprocal of
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log(exitvaluei=valuei;1), increase investment ows and thus help projects to be completed faster.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
We briey discuss a possible variation of our model that explicitly incorporates agency costs, before
turning to concluding remarks.
8.1 Agency Costs
In contrast to most of the preceding theoretical work on venture capital, including Bergemann and
Hege (1998), (2005), we did not focus on the agency costs but rather considered a convex cost of
investment to model the intertemporal investment ow. We now briey discuss how an agency
model would lead to similar theoretical predictions as the convex cost model.
Consider the following variation of the model with an agency conict. The agency conict arises
because the project is now run by a manager (or entrepreneur) who can divert the capital ow it
(or a part of it) for the purposes of consumption, and derive a utility of it of the diverted capital
ow, where   1. If the capital is diverted rather than invested, the project makes no progress
and the position kt does not change. If the manager diverts funds in period t, he is detected
instantaneously with probability q; a deviation in t will not be detected at any point after t. If
detected, the manager can be red and replaced by an identical manager. For simplicity, there is
no cost to ring and replacement. To study the role of agency in isolation, we also assume linear,
rather than convex, investment costs, dkt = itdt.
The information structure is as follows. We assume that the signal indicating that the unknown
critical threshold k was hit is public, observable to nancier and manager. However, only the
manager observes whether the investment funds it are invested or diverted. In consequence, the
nancier cannot distinguish whether the project progresses according to plan and is so far successful,
or whether the manager has diverted the capital.
To solve the agency conict and to prevent diversion, the nancier has to provide incentives
to the manager. In this environment, the optimal incentive contract is a payment contingent on
nal success, denoted by w. We assume that the nancier can commit to a xed payment w in
the event of a successful completion of the project. Consider now an equilibrium in which the
manager has the proper incentives to invest, so that the nanciers equilibrium beliefs are that
the position kt moves according to the equilibrium investment ow it. In this equilibrium, the
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nancier will provide just enough nancing so that the point K can be reached if no capital is ever
diverted. If the manager diverts capital, irrespective whether he does so just for an instant or for
an extended period, the nancier still beliefs that investment has been done according to plan. As
a consequence, the nancier and the managers beliefs on the position kt diverge, with only the
manager observing the true position. Therefore, if the manager deviates at some point and diverts
capital, he will run out of money, i.e. get no new capital before reaching K. At this point at the
latest, the deviation is detected, and since replacement is costless, the manager will be replaced
and lose any claim to the wage w.
It follows that, if the manager diverts in t, his best continuation policy is to continue to divert
all money until he is either detected or has run out of money. We can, therefore, restrict attention
to deviations that follow a maximum diversion policy ; i.e. the manager will continue diverting all
capital until detected or funding stops. With the linear investment cost, the optimal investment
ow is now the maximal incentive compatible investment ow possible at any given time t. The













The incentive compatibility condition then requires that, at any t 2 (0; T ),
It Wt.
The funding in period t is now unconstrained until It =Wt and in equilibrium the funding intensity
is uniquely determined by this equality. The recursive solution for the path of maximal investments
and the optimal level of w characterizes the optimal investment path. It can be shown that the
optimal it will be strictly increasing over time.8 The intuition is that the managers expected
utility derived from the contingent compensation w is always increasing over time. By contrast the
present value of the diversion benet, which is a fraction  of the expected value of investments,
will only increase over time if it (and subsequent funds) are large enough to tempt the manager
into diverting the funds.
8The analysis of this moral hazard problem uses insights from Bergemann and Hege (2005) and is avalaible from
the authors upon request.
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The main prediction of Proposition 1 could thus be derived just as well in a model with agency
costs rather than convex investment costs. The intuition is that the more uncertain it is that the
project will ultimately reach position K, the more costly it is to provide incentives. Slowing down
helps to optimally control these costs. One important lesson of our analysis is then that the real
option character of sequential investments, and the gradual resolution of uncertainty they imply,
gives rise to this conclusion even before agency conicts - intensively investigated elsewhere - are
taken into account.
8.2 Concluding Remarks
We propose a dynamic model to analyze how investors make optimal investment decisions in an
innovative project as a function of their information about failure risk and potential nal value. We
consider the complete investment cycle and assume that information leading to the failure of the
project may arise at any time, but at a decreasing probability. The investors choose the optimal
speed and staging of the investments.
Our theoretical analysis shows that investment ows should be optimally increasing as the
project advances, and our empirical analysis conrms this hypothesis. We also nd empirically
that surviving returns are decreasing, which is interesting in the context of our model as it implies
that the failure risk must decrease over time at a su¢ ciently high rate. Our model also shows that
the optimal staging sequence depends on the value of the real option to abandon. We nd in our
data that the design of the nancing rounds follows the optimal pattern predicted by our model:
the investment size and the investment ow is increasing from one round to the next, and projects
with a high initial estimate of the nal value or an optimistic appraisal are likely to succeed with
fewer rounds than less valuable or more risky projects. We show that information updates about
the expected nal value or the failure probability are incorporated in all subsequent investment
decisions. The subsequent investment ows increase, and the number of subsequent investment
rounds decrease, if the projects valuation is marked up. Our evidence shows that initially, investors
seem to have little ability to predict the eventual probability of success, but have some forecasting
ability about the nal project value conditional on success. As the project advances, investors
appear to get more accurate information. We nd that the subsequent investment ow as well as
the size of each round and the number of subsequent rounds react in the way predicted by our
model.
Several possible extensions could be considered. In our analysis, we focus exclusively on in-
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formation arrival about the failure rate  and the subsequent empirical analysis underlines the
importance of this type of interim learning. However, it is possible that the investors also learn
about the expected nal value Y of venture projects. Changes in the expectations about future
values could further address the phenomenon of uctuations in the rms values, a well-known
phenomenon in venture nancing (for example, acquisition values as well as IPO values uctuate
substantially according to market conditions). Finally, throughout the analysis we have assumed
that the venture realizes a terminal value Y in a given terminal state K. But clearly, the timing
of the exit and the associated value of the venture at the exit time are important decisions for the




The appendix contains the proofs of all propositions in the main body of the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider the dynamic investment problem with uncertainty. We
showed in the main body of the text that the ordinary di¤erential equation resulting from the
optimal investment policy can be represented in its canonical form:








With a change of variable given by W (kt) ,
p
V (kt), we can transform the above nonlinear
di¤erential equation into a linear rst order di¤erential equation. We observe that






and hence V 0 (kt) = 2W (kt)W 0 (kt). Replacing V (kt) and V 0 (kt) by W (kt) and W 0 (kt) in (14)
we get:







W (kt) : (16)








































Consequently, the value function V (kt), based on the solution ofW (kt) in (17) is given by V (kt) =
(W (kt))
2. We can immediately establish the properties (1)-(3) of the optimal investment it by
using the linear relationship (6). We can explicitly express the optimal investment in terms of the
primitives of the model:

























(1.) We obtain by elementary calculus that @i=@k > 0 and @i2=@2k > 0.
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(2.) We obtain by elementary calculus that @i=@ < 0 and @i2=@2 < 0.
(3.) We obtain by elementary calculus that @i=@Y > 0 and @i2=@2Y > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. The surviving return Rt , R (kt) = 1 + r (kt) is given, using (9) by:



















Using the same change of variable as in Proposition 1, we nd that
r (kt) =  r + 2
p
rW 0 (kt) .
Using (16) to replace W 0 (kt) we have:












and we now ask whether r0 (kt) is positive or negative:












and using (16) again to replace W 0 (kt) we get:





















































We use the solution for the value functionW (kt) from Proposition 1 to insert it into (18). It su¢ ces


















































































































Thus if K is not too large and  is su¢ ciently below 2, then the surviving returns are declining
everywhere. Conversely if K is large or  above or just below 2, then the surviving returns are
increasing in kt, and hence in time, everywhere. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The optimal investment policy i1;1 given the initial state k0 can be






























 = 0, (20)
Based on (20), the solution to the optimal investment policy i1;1 for a single stage investment can
be shown to be strictly increasing in Y and k0 and strictly decreasing in .
If, in contrast, the project is funded in two stages, then the optimal funding policy starting at
the initial position k0 has to make three distinct choices: it has to determine the initial funding
level i1;2, the continued funding level i2;2 and the funding renewal state k1. Conditional on the
optimal funding level given the renewal stage k1, the value function in the initial state k0 is given
as the solution to the optimization problem (12):





























We can insert (11) into (12) to get:

























































We now establish the results of this proposition.
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1. We rst observe that i2;2 > i1;1 by the comparative static property of the optimal investment
policy i1;1 obtained above for the single stage funding policy. After all, the funding policy i2;2 of the
project conditional on renewing the project is like a single stage funding, but at a higher level of
the state kt. Given a nal state K, we denote by k0 an initial state at which the value conditional
on an optimal single stage funding policy equals the value conditional on an optimal two stage
funding policy, and hence V1;1 (k0) = V1;2 (k

0). We show that i1;2 < i1;1. In the two stage funding
policy, the optimal renewal occurs at k1 and conditional on renewal, we have a value function
V2;2 (k1). By construction, we have V2;2 (k1) > V1;1 (k1). We now show that it follows from here
that pV2;2 (k1)  V1;1 (k1). The proof is by contradiction. If pV2;2 (k1) > V1;1 (k1), then starting at
k0, and having the advantage of determining the investment level to optimally arrive at k1, the two
stage funding policy does at least as well as the one stage funding policy which runs through the
state k1 with intensity i1;1. As the initial funding policy in the two stage funding seeks to determine
the optimal intensity to arrive at a stopping point k1 with a value pV2;2 (k1)  V1;1 (k1), it follows
that it will choose a strictly lower investment policy i1;2 than i1;1. Notice that i1;1 was determined
to optimally reach the higher value V1;1 (K) rather than V1;1 (k1).
2. We rst establish the uniqueness of k0 for a given nal state K by a single crossing argument.
The uniqueness result of k0 given K then translates directly into a uniqueness result about K

given k0, where K is the unique nal state at which the value from an optimal one-stage and
two-stage policy, respectively, coincide when starting at k0. We observe that the value functions
V1;1 (kt) and V1;2 (kt) are continuous and di¤erentiable in kt. We next show that if
V1;1 (k
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0). We note that the value functions of each program, V1;1 (k
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Next we express the value function Vl;m (k) in terms of the investment level il;m and the rst



















We determine the sign of V 01;1(k

0)   V 01;2 (k0) by analyzing how V 01;1(k0) and V 01;2 (k0) di¤er given
the di¤erent investment intensities: i1;2 < i1;1, established in part 1 of this proposition while
maintaining the hypothesis of equal values given by (22). We determine how V 0 (k0) changes as
we change the investment level i from i1;2 to i1;1. For the purpose of this argument, we omit the
subscripts l;m and write the value function V (k0; i) to depend on k

0 and i. Consequently, we rewrite
(23) as :


























We establish the sign of @2V (k0; i) =@k
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> 0 , i  rV (k0; i) > 0. (26)
We complete the argument by establishing that the second inequality in (26) holds. We observe
that if the investors were allowed to determine the investment ow optimally in every instant, then













i = rV (k0; i) .
But in fact, as we consider the optimal investment decision subject to staging, the optimal invest-
ment i1;m is determined with respect to some average valuation over the course of the investment
round, and thus as the value is increasing in the current position kt, we nd that at the beginning












which establishes (26). 
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Proof of Proposition 4. 1. The investment decisions i1;1 and i1;2 represent solutions to similar
problems. The sole di¤erence is that the terminal value of the investment problem of i1;1 is given
by Y whereas the terminal value of the investment problem of i1;2 is given by some fraction of Y ,
say q Y , with q 2 (0; 1). The optimal investment i1;2 is taking the solution to the optimal stopping
problem at k1 as given. Hence the smaller benet, q  Y is reached at an earlier stage, namely,
k = k1. It follows that we can represent the investment decisions i1;1 and i1;2 as:
i1;1 2 argmax
i2R+




fpk1 (i)  q  Y   ck1 (i)g ;
respectively. The term pk (i) represents the discounted probability that a positive terminal value
is realized in position k given an investment ow i and the term ck (i) represents the associated
discounted cost to reach the position k with a constant investment ow i. By hypothesis, the value
of these problems is equal at k0, or
pK (i1;1)  Y   cK (i1;1) = pk1 (i1;2)  q  Y   ck1 (i1;2) . (27)
Since the cost of reaching K is strictly larger than reaching k1, we have
cK (i1;1) > ck1 (i1;2) ,
but this implies by (27) that
pK (i1;1) > pk1 (i1;2)  q. (28)
Hence it follows from the envelope theorem that a marginal increase in Y is more benecial to the
single round funding regime by (28), which establishes that k0 is decreasing in Y .
The argument for an increase of k0 in response to an increase in the failure  is similar to the
above argument regarding Y .
2. The marginal benet of extending k1 is increased by an increase in p and hence it leads to an
increase in k1 despite the increase in the marginal cost.
3. This follows immediately from the Proposition 3.1. 
Proof of Proposition 5. 1. The probability of success given a constant failure probability  at
kt is given by







The probability P (kt) before the resolution of uncertainty about the failure rate is given by:
0 = P 0 (kt) 

kt
P (kt) +  ((1  )Pl (kt) + Ph (kt)  P (kt)) , (30)
and inserting Pl (kt) and Ph (kt) from (29) we get:
0 = P 0 (kt) 

kt















By (30), the probability P (kt) is an average of Pl (kt) and Ph (kt) and the result follows from
Pl (kt) > P (kt) > Ph (kt).
2. The optimal investment policy before the resolution of uncertainty about the failure rate is given
as the solution to the dynamic programming equation:










V (kt) +  ((1  )Vl (kt) + Vh (kt)  V (kt))

,








V (kt) +  ((1  )Vl (kt) + Vh (kt)  V (kt))
2
,












it = rV (kt) .
But as Vh (kt) < V (kt) < Vl (kt) ; it follows that it;h < it < it;l, which completes the proof.
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Table 1 Summary of Firm Characteristics 
 
This table reports the number of firms (Panel A), means and standard deviations of pre-exit 
rounds per firm (Panel B) and the duration (months) from the first round to the exit round for 
firms (Panel C). The five top lines in Panel A contain the raw data, in which exits are documented 
as either IPO, M&A, Down (= out of business) and Unknown.  In Panel B and C, the four top 
lines report the raw data.  The two bottom lines of each panel A (in italics) report the number of 
firms with exit Unknown that we reclassify as either Down or Alive, according to the estimation 
procedure based on round duration laid out in Section 6.  
 
Industry Health care IT Retail Others Total 
 
Panel A: # of firms 
IPO 541 1,039 213 227 2,020 
M&A 451 1,654 248 312 2,665 
Down 137 556 200 45 938 
Unknown 1,757 7,326 1,042 3,187 13,312 
Total 2,886 10,575 1,703 3,771 18,935 
Down 1,352 5,892 1,087 2,526 10,857 
Alive 542 1,990 155 706 3,393 
 
Panel B: Pre-exit rounds per firm: average [standard deviation] 
IPO 3.89 [2.46] 3.43 [2.26] 3.18 [1.92] 2.29 [2.01] 3.40 [2.30] 
M&A 3.38 [2.46] 2.93 [2.29] 3.10 [2.65] 2.19 [1.96] 2.94 [2.34] 
Down 3.72 [3.02] 3.15 [2.29] 3.02 [1.84] 2.51 [1.94] 3.17 [2.32] 
All 3.66 [2.54] 3.13 [2.29] 3.10 [2.20] 2.25 [1.98] 3.14 [2.33] 
Down 2.78 [2.23] 2.20 [1.77] 2.87 [1.78] 1.74 [1.42] 2.23 [1.80] 
All 3.15 [2.38] 2.49 [2.00] 2.95 [1.96] 1.83 [1.55] 2.50 [2.02] 
 
Panel C: Duration (months) before exit: average [standard deviation] 
IPO 45.83 [26.90] 43.45 [28.40] 34.80 [26.27] 36.57 [28.28] 42.41 [28.00] 
M&A 49.19 [32.06] 40.74 [32.16] 37.65 [29.70] 45.15 [35.43] 42.40 [32.50] 
Down 74.10 [34.70] 59.46 [41.84] 45.05 [34.58] 49.89 [34.77] 58.07 [40.01] 
All 50.61 [31.31] 44.81 [33.60] 38.97 [30.49] 42.19 [33.05] 45.02 [32.90] 
Down 34.11 [29.68] 23.55 [24.53] 29.97 [25.84] 18.70 [19.77] 24.38 [29.81] 





Table 2 Summary of Pre-exit Round Characteristics 
 
This table reports the number of pre-exit rounds, as well as means and standard deviations of 
duration prior to each round (months), investment volume per round (million $), and the ratios of 
investment volume to post-money valuations, for firms in healthcare, IT, retail and other 
industries.  Firms are classified into the exit types IPO, M&A, Down (out of business) or Alive 
(not yet exited) according to both documented and estimated exits. 
 
Industry Health care IT Retail Others Total 
 
Panel A: # of Pre-exit Rounds 
Exit: IPO 2,103 3,563 678 519 6,863 
Exit: M&A 1,525 4,844 770 684 7,823 
Exit: Down 3,752 12,969 3,122 4,401 24.244 
Alive 1,629 5,248 650 1,078 8,605 
Total 9,009 26,624 5,220 6,682 47,535 
 
Panel B: Pre-financing duration (months): average [standard deviation] 
Exit: IPO 10.77 [9.47] 11.16 [10.09] 10.28 [9.84] 10.80 [10.13] 10.93 [9.87] 
Exit: M&A 10.96 [9.70] 10.35 [10.30] 8.80 [7.52] 11.69 [9.85] 10.42 [9.92] 
Exit: Down 11.88 [10.39] 10.38 [9.79] 9.61 [9.19] 12.34 [14.25] 10.81 [10.59] 
Alive 11.83 [9.93] 10.53 [8.78] 9.93 [8.29] 14.41 [18.10] 11.00 [9.99] 
Total 11.43 [9.97] 10.53 [9.75] 9.58 [8.93] 12.36 [13.99] 10.79 [10.24] 
 
Panel C: Investment volume (million $): average [standard deviation]  
Exit: IPO 5.72 [9.28] 7.16 [12.70] 11.35 [20.45] 14.13 [46.66] 7.65 [17.83] 
Exit: M&A 3.78 [5.20] 4.93 [11.07] 7.06 [13.23] 7.28 [48.71] 5.12 [17.50] 
Exit: Down 4.93 [11.93] 8.10 [16.96] 8.87 [14.19] 6.37 [19.50] 7.46 [27.96] 
Alive 7.36 [10.48] 9.77 [17.59] 8.36 [12.41] 10.08 [27.53] 9.19 [17.15] 
Total 5.33 [10.25] 7.69 [15.69] 8.88 [14.91] 7.46 [27.96] 7.34 [17.02] 
 
Panel D: Ratio of investment to post-money valuation: average [standard deviation] 
Exit: IPO 0.30 [0.21] 0.25 [0.18] 0.25 [0.17] 0.31 [0.23] 0.27 [0.19] 
Exit: M&A 0.34 [0.20] 0.27 [0.17] 0.30 [0.18] 0.30 [0.20] 0.29 [0.18] 
Exit: Down 0.32 [0.19] 0.28 [0.17] 0.30 [0.17] 0.28 [0.23] 0.29 [0.18] 
Alive 0.33 [0.20] 0.30 [0.18] 0.29 [0.17] 0.26 [0.22] 0.31 [0.19] 







Table 3 Firm Characteristics: IPO/M&A vs Down Firms 
 
This table summarizes the post-money valuation (million $ in log) of the first round , the 
investment volume (million $ in log) in the first round  , the ratio of investment volume to post-
money valuation in the first round (in log) ) ⁄ , the ratio of investment volume in the first 
round to the duration between first and the second round (in log) ⁄ , and the abnormal return 
per month (gross return in log) from the first round to the second round , for IPO/M&A firms 
and Down firms. Down firms are firms with documented and estimated exits being Down. The 
reported numbers are means, standard deviations (in parenthesis) and the number of observations 
used to calculate the means and standard deviations (in brackets).  This table also reports the t-
statistics and corresponding p-values for testing the hypotheses of identical means between 















T statistic: -4.887 







T statistic: -1.764 
P value: 0.078 






T statistic: 0.963 
P value: 0.336 






T statistic: -6.824 







T statistic: 25.335 
P value: 0.000 
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Table 4 Probit Analysis of Firm Exits 
 
This table reports the results of a probit analysis regarding the determinants of the exit types of VC-backed firms.  For firm , ,  is the post-
money valuation at round 1, ,  is the average monthly abnormal return (gross return in log) between round 1 and 2, ,  is the investment 
flow for round 1 (investment volume in round 1 divided by the number of months between round 1 and round 2).  Exit classifications are as in 
Table 2. The regressions also include a vector of dummies for the business status (start up, in development, and shipping and profitable) at the time 
of its first financing round, and for the industry (IT, health, and retail) of the firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level.  
 











































Table 5 Determinants of Exit Values of Successful Firms 
 
This table reports the regression results regarding the determinants of the exit values for IPO and M&A firms. 
. , , ,  
In the above equation, for firm , .  is the exit value (IPO market value minus capital raised from IPO or post M&A value minus capital 
infused), ,  is the post-money valuation at round 1, ,  is the average monthly abnormal return (gross return in log) between round 1 and 
2, ,  is the investment flow for round 1 (investment volume in round 1 divided by the number of months between round 1 and round 2). The 
vector  contains dummies for the business status (start up, in development, and shipping and profitable) at the time of its first financing 
round, and for the industry (IT, health, and retail) of the firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
 
 Regression 1 
 
Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
,  ***0.200 
(0.038) 
  ***0.190 
(0.044) 








Sample Size 807 
 
658 1,817 657 
R2 0.12 
 





Table 6 Tests on Pareto Distribution of Failure Risk 
 
Panel A of this table reports the number of all pre-exit non mezzanine rounds that lead to another 
round or an exit, the number of them that lead to another round or a successful exit (surviving 
rounds), and the survival probability (surviving rounds divided by all pre-exit rounds) for 
different round types.  Round types are determined according to the round status reported in the 
data (left column) and according to their sequence number in the round sequence of each 
company (right column).  Panel A also reports the means and medians of post-financing gross 
returns per month (in log) for surviving rounds (surviving returns) and for all non-exit rounds 
(unconditional returns).  Panel B reports results of probit analyses regarding the determinants of 
survivals.  In the analyses, the dependant binary variable equals 1 for surviving rounds and 0 for 
failing rounds.  Explanatory variables are a dummy that equals 1 for all early and late rounds (left 
column) or all 2nd and 3rd rounds (right column), a dummy that equals 1 for all late rounds (left 
column) or all 3rd rounds (right column), industry dummies, and dummies for the months when 




Panel A: Survival summary 
Variables Round Status Round Sequence 
 First/Seed Early Late 1st 2nd 3rd 
Total rounds 
 
16,665 16,488 10,611 17,488 10,180 6,424 
Surviving 
rounds 
11,852 12,542 8,547 12,224 7,786 5,104 
Survival 
probability 
0.711 0.761 0.805 0.699 0.764 0.795 
Surviving 
return mean 
0.086 0.062 0.057 17,488 10,180 6,424 
Surviving 
return median 
0.056 0.039 0.028 12,224 7,786 5,104 
Unconditional 
return mean 
-0.459 -0.413 -0.315 0.699 0.764 0.795 
Unconditional 
return median 
0.022 0.015 0.015 0.699 0.764 0.795 
 
Panel B: Probit analysis of survivals 
Variables Dummy for early 
and late 
Dummy for late Dummy for 2nd 
and 3rd 












Table 7 Tests on Risk Neutrality (Constant Expected Returns) 
 
Panel A of this table reports the t-statistics and corresponding p-values (in parentheses) for the 
equality of means of unconditional gross returns (post-financing gross returns for all non-exit 
rounds) per month (in log) between rounds.  Panel B reports the results for Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests for the equality of the medians of unconditional gross returns.  Both tests use all return 
observations for each type of round.  The return observations are not in pairs, and the numbers of 
return observations from different types of rounds are not necessarily equal.  Negative t-statistics 
indicate that earlier rounds have lower means. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, and * at 10% level. 
 
 
Panel A. Mean equality tests for unconditional returns 









Early - -1.388 
(0.165) 
2nd Round - **-2.026 
(0.043) 
 
Panel B. Median equality tests for unconditional returns 
 Early Late  2nd Round 3rd Round 
First/Seed *0.0555 
 
0.399 1st Round **0.021 ***0.004 
Early - 
 




Table 8 Firm-matched Investment Volume, Investment Flow across Rounds 
 
Panel A reports the means, medians and standard deviations of investment volume (million $) and 
investment flow (million $ per month) for individual rounds according to round types. This table 
only includes rounds from firms that have all three round statuses (left column) or at least three 
rounds (right column) before exit. Round types are determined according to round status (left 
column) and round sequence (right column) as in Table 7.  Panel B reports tests for the equality 
of the means and medians for investment volume and flow across rounds for the firms.  We first 
subtract the tested variable for later rounds from earlier rounds, and then use t-tests to test the null 
hypothesis that the means of the differences are positive (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to test the 
null hypothesis that the medians of the differences are positive).  Negative t-statistics indicate that 
earlier rounds have lower means. The reported numbers for the mean equality tests are t-statistics, 
and the reported numbers for the median equality tests are p-values. *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
 
 
Panel A Summary statistics 
Round Status Round Order 
Variables First 
 







# of firms 3,336 # of firms 6,464 
mean 4.745 7.746 10.040 mean 4.751 6.653 8.806 
median 2.195 4.000 4.815 median 2.000 3.000 3.750 
Std. dev. 15.778 13.239 15.832 Std. dev. 15.217 15.251 16.936 
Investment flow 
# of firms 3,049 # of firms 6,103 
mean 0.759 1.279 1.928 mean 0.802 1.059 1.452 
median 0.242 0.444 0.603 median 0.227 0.333 0.404 
Std. dev. 2.418 3.860 8.395 Std. dev. 3.292 2.893 4.921 
 
Panel B. Equality tests 
Investment volume mean tests 
 Early Late  2nd Round 3rd Round 
First/Seed ***-10.713 ***-8.335 1st Round ***-8.764 ***-9.552 
Early - ***-15.202 2nd Round - ***-15.560 
Investment volume median tests 
 Early Late  2nd Round 3rd Round 
First/Seed ***0 ***0 1st Round ***0 ***0 
Early - ***0 2nd Round - ***0 
Investment flow mean tests 
 Early Late  2nd Round 3rd Round 
First/Seed ***-7.218 ***-4.001 1st Round ***-5.202 ***-5.840 
Early - ***-7.499 2nd Round - ***-9.105 
Investment flow median tests 
 Early Late  2nd Round 3rd Round 
First/Seed ***0 ***0 1st Round ***0 ***0 




Table 9 Determinants of Firms’ First Round Investment Flow 
 
This table reports the regression results regarding the determinants of firms’ first round investment flow.  
, , .  
In the above equation, for firm , ,  is the investment flow for round 1 (investment volume in round 1 divided by the number of months 
between round 1 and round 2), ,  is the post-money valuation of the firm at round 1, .  is the exit value of the firm (IPO market 
value minus capital raised from IPO, or post M&A value minus capital infused, or $1 for firms going out of business).  The vector  
contains dummies for the business status (start up, in development, and in production) at the time of the first financing round, and for the industry 
(IT, health, and retail) of the firm.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
 
 Unconditional regressions (all firms) 
 
Conditional on successful exits (IPO and M&A firms) 
 
 Regression 1 
 
Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
















Sample size 4,122 
 
12,467 2,946 1,429 1,817 806 
R2 0.51 
 





Table 10 Determinants of Round Investment Flow 
 
This table reports the regression results regarding the determinants of the investment flow (investment volume divided by the duration between 
current and next rounds) for all non-exit rounds. 
, , , , ,  
, , ,  
In the above equation, for firm , ,  is the investment flow for round  (investment volume in round  divided by the number of months 
between round  and round 1), ,  is the average monthly abnormal return (gross return in log) between round   1 and , ,  is the 
post-money valuation of the firm (million $) at round 1, ,  is the sum of all investment volume (million $) from the first round to 
round 1. The vector ,  contains dummies for the business status (start up, in development, and in production) at the time of the first 
financing round, for mezzanine rounds, and for the industry (IT, health, and retail) of the firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard deviations are in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
 
 Regression 1 
 
Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 




















,   ***0.571 
(0.017) 
  ***0.253 
(0.027) 










4,408 4,408 4,406 4,334 4,334 
R2 
 





Table 11 Determinants of Pre-exit Rounds for Successful Firms 
 
This table reports the regression results regarding the determinants of the number of rounds before exit for all IPO and M&A firms. 
.
,
, , .  
In the above equation, for firm ,  is the number of financing rounds before exit, .  is the exit value (IPO market value minus 
capital raised from IPO or post M&A value minus capital infused), ,  is the post-money valuation at round 1, ,  is the average monthly 
abnormal return (gross return in log) between round 1 and 2. The vector  contains dummies for the business status (start up, in 
development, and in production) at the time of the first financing round, and for the industry (IT, health, and retail) of the firm. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard deviations are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
 
 Regression 1 
 
























Sample size 807 
 
658 807 658 
R2 0.21 
 





Table 12 Determinants of Round Investment Volume 
 
This table reports the regression results regarding the determinants of the investment volume for all non-exit rounds. 
, , , , ,  
, , ,  
In the above equation, for firm , ,  is the investment volume (raised capital in million $) in round , ,  is the average monthly 
abnormal return (gross return in log) between round   1 and , ,  is the post-money valuation of the firm (million $) at round 1, 
,  is the sum of all investment volume (million $) from the first round to round 1. The vector ,  contains dummies for the 
business status (start up, in development, and in production) at the time of the first financing round, for mezzanine rounds, and for the industry (IT, 
health, and retail) of the firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, and * at 10% level. 
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,   ***0.486 
(0.015) 
  ***0.217 
(0.023) 










4,962 4,602 4,599 4,518 4,518 
R2 
 





Table 13 Determinants of Pre-exit Duration for Successful Firms 
 







In the above equation, for firm ,  is the number of months from the first round to the exit, ,  is the average monthly abnormal return 
(gross return in log) between round 1 and 2, ,  is the post-money valuation at round 1, ,  is the investment volume (million $) 
in round 1, .  is the exit value (IPO market value minus capital raised from IPO or post M&A value minus capital infused). The vector 
 contains dummies for the business status (start up, in development, and in production) at the time of the first financing round, and for the 
industry (IT, health, and retail) of the firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
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,   ***-0.284 
(0.018) 
















Sample size 890 
 
890 889 658 657 
R2 0.25 
 
0.41 0.25 0.040 0.49 
 















Figure 2: Staging and Investment Flow     
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